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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BOARD OF EDUCATION RULE RE-
QUIRING PRIOR REVIEW OF ALL STUDENT LITERATURE DISTRIBUTED IN
HIGH SCHOOLS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In 1970, three Chicago public high school students were sus-
pended for distributing written material at school without first hav-
ing obtained approval from administrative officials. Two of the stu-
dents had published and distributed copies of an "underground"
newspaper, The Cosmic Frog. The third student had been suspended
twice: once for handing a petition calling for an anti-war teach-in
to another student in the school corridor; and a second time for dis-
tributing anti-war leaflets to other students while assembled outdoors
during a fire drill. Each suspension charged "gross disobedience" or
misconduct as defined by section 6-19 of the rules of the Chicago
Board of Education which stated:
No person shall be permitted ... to distribute on the school premises
any books, tracts, or other publications,... unless the same shall have
been approved by the General Superintendent of Schools.
The three students brought a class action in federal district court
on behalf of themselves and all students in Chicago high schools.
The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the inclusion of the sus-
pensions on their school records and a judgment declaring section
6-19 of the board of education rules unconstitutional. At a hearing
on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court granted the
injunction to the extent of expunging the students' records of all
suspensions except that one arising from the fire drill incident. Never-
theless, the remainder of the suit was dismissed, the court failing to
hand down any definite declaration concerning the constitutionality
or enforceability of section 6-19. The plaintiffs were also denied per-
mission to maintain a class action.
On appeal, the plaintiff-appellants argued that the board rule
operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint of their freedom of
expression. The defendants contended that the rule was constitu-
tionally permissible since it did not require approval of the content
of the literature distributed but, presumably, only approval of the
distribution itself. Finding that section 6-19 would require prior ap-
proval of the content of publications, the Seventh Circuit Court of
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Appeals reversed the district court and remanded the case with in-
structions to enjoin enforcement of the rule. All suspensions, includ-
ing that of the third student for distribution of literature during a
fire drill, were ordered expunged from the students' records. Held:
The rule of the Chicago Board of Education prohibiting distribution
of all publications on school premises without approval by the su-
perintendent of schools is unconstitutional as a prior restraint in vio-
lation of the first amendment. Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460
F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
Recognition of the first amendment rights of high school stu-
dents as it has developed over the past 50 years has effected a reorien-
tation, at least in the legal sense, of the roles of school and student.
Justification for the school's regulation of student activity had formerly
been based on the theories that the school stood in loco parentis, that
education was a privilege accorded the student at the institution's
discretion, or that the student impliedly waived his rights by con-
tracting with the school. These theories have been generally dis-
avowed. Courts recognize that the public school functions as an
agency of the state, serving in the interest of the state, and that its
authority is derived from the state.1 In 1923, the Supreme Court main-
tained that the right to teach and to acquire knowledge may not be
abridged by arbitrary and capricious legislative action,2 setting a
standard of reasonableness for state action through the school system.
Later, the rights of students were further delineated by the Supreme
Court in the following language:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, pro-
tects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures--Boards
of Education not excepted. These [Boards] have, of course, important,
delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.3
1. See Developments in the Lawo--Academic Freedom, 81 HAuv. L. REv. 1045,
1144-48 (1968). An example of such statutory authorization is N.Y. EDU. LAW §
1709(2) (McKinney 1969), where the board of education of every union free school
district is given authority:
To establish such rules and regulations concerning the order and discipline of
the schools, in the several departments thereof, as they may deem necessary
to secure the best educational results.
2. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
(These cases concern state statutes prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in
parochial schools.)
3. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (freedom of
religion held to be abridged by statute mandating daily recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance).
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The Court proposed that the school, in its task of educating the young
for citizenship, should serve as an exemplar of civil liberties protec-
tion. The Fifth Circuit, in Burnside v. Byars,4 held that while the
state and the school have a duty to maintain the educational system,
regulation of student freedoms must be reasonable and imposed only
when essential to order and discipline within the institution.5 School
boards cannot
ignore expression of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.
They cannot infringe on their students' right to free and unrestricted
expression . . .where the exercise of such rights in the school ...
[does] not materially and substantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.6
Implementing the foregoing reasoning, the court in Burnside held
that students in Philadelphia, Mississippi, were justified in wearing
"freedom buttons" to school in violation of the principal's order
where it was evident that the students had not been disruptive.7 Con-
versely, in a companion case, the court upheld the suspension of stu-
dents where it found that the violated regulation had been reason-
able in light of disturbances at the school, and that the violation had
caused substantial disruption.8
It was the Burnside standard of material and substantial dis-
ruption which the Supreme Court adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District9 to test administrative regulation of stu-
dent freedom of expression. In Tinker, students were suspended for
wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam war after having
been forbidden to do so by school officials. The Court held that the
students' manner of expression was protected by the first amendment.
"It can hardly be argued," stated the Court, "that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate."' 0 One of the functions of the school
is to accommodate students for the purpose of certain activities, one
of those being communication among the students" and such com-
4. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
5. Id. at 749.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 748.
8. Blackwell v. Issaquenna Co. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
9. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10. Id. at 506.
11. Id. at 512.
613
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munication may not be confined to officially approved opinions or
topics.12 Examining the record, the Court concluded that although
the students' armbands had generated a certain amount of contro-
versy, school authorities could not reasonably "forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities . . .13
The opinion noted that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.' u4
The principles promulgated in Tinker have since been applied
in cases involving various forms of student expression including
newspapers and other student publications. For example, in Zucker
v. Panitz,'5 school authorities objected to the introduction of politics
into the school-funded newspaper through a student-placed advertise-
ment protesting the Vietnam war. The court, nevertheless, found it
to be a protected, traditional, and non-disruptive manner of exercis-
ing freedom of expression. Concededly, school authorities may en-
force regulations which are reasonable and necessary to the mainte-
nance of school order and discipline. Officials may, for example, regu-
late the time, place, and manner of the distribution of literature. 0
However, where the enforcement of rules infringes upon a student's
freedom of expression, the burden is upon the school to justify the
infringement. 17 This definition of the school's position was drawn by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Scoville v. Board of Educa-
tion.'s There, the unapproved distribution of an underground news-
paper violated school rules, and the newspaper itself was found to
be in contempt of authority and to encourage disobedience. Relying
12. Id. at 511.
13. Id. at 514.
14. Id. at 508.
15. 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
16. Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 150 (ist Cir. 1971).
17. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970). But see Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting):
I certainly agree that state public school authorities in the discharge of their
responsibilities are not wholly exempt from the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment respecting the freedoms of expression and association. . . . I
would... cast upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular
school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns-for
example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view,
while permitting expression of the dominant opinion.
18. 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
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on Tinker, the court maintained that when first amendment rights
are involved, a school may be required to bear the risk of potential
disruption arising from the free expression of student opinions. Un-
less the school can demonstrate that the expression "could reason-
able have led [the board] to forecast substantial disruption.. ."19 the
right to freedom of expression must prevail.
Various jurisdictions have inconsistently judged the implementa-
tion of school policies with respect to student literature which might
substantially interfere with the operation of the school. Interpreting
Tinker broadly, one court found that disruption resulting from dis-
tribution of a student-published underground newspaper was not
substantial enough to warrant any infringement upon first amend-
ment rights.20 However, another court-acting in a university setting
-accepted the school officials' appraisal of imminent disorder, and
held that the officials were justified in imposing an immediate ban on
certain literature rather than waiting for harm to ensue.21 Determina-
tion of the point at which school officials may assert their authority
over student publications has provoked considerable judicial contro-
versy. May censorship precede the distribution of literature and the
perceived disorder or must there be an actual demonstration of disrup-
tion? In other words, is a school obliged to rely upon subsequent pun-
ishment as a deterrent to disruptive literature, or may it invoke prior
restraint? The conflict merits an examination of the prior restraint
doctrine.
Prior restraint of expression, either by an absolute prohibition
of certain forms of communication or by censorship of material prior
to distribution, is often justified by the value of preventing abuses
of uninhibited speech in certain circumstances. However, such re-
straint may also inhibit activities actually protected by the first amend-
ment without a showing of a real threat to the state's interest. The
doctrine against prior restraint was incorporated into the Constitution
by the first amendment as a reaction to the censorship and licensing
19. Id. at 13, quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
20. Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1339 (S.D. Tex.
1969).
21. Norton v. Discipline Comm., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969)-, cert. denied, 399
U.S. 906 (1970), discussed in Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker
Distinguished, 59 Gno. L.J., 37, 43-44 (1970) (Haskell maintains that Norton, as a
case involving university students, should set the outer limits of high school students'
rights).
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laws which had once dominated the English press.22 The Supreme
Court stated in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson:
In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been
generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose
of the [first amendment] guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication.23
Nevertheless, the Court went on to enumerate certain unprotected
areas of speech which operate as exceptions to the doctrine against
against prior restraint: speech which would hinder the nation in war-
time; speech which would incite violence or forceful overthrow of the
government; or speech which is obscene.24 In support of these excep-
tions the Court relied upon two of its previous decisions which had
excluded words with "the effect of force" 25 from first amendment pro-
tection. The determinant in evaluating the protection available for the
expression had been held to be whether "the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent." 26
Objections to implementation of prior restraints have primarily
focused upon the lack of procedural safeguards and the greater fre-
quency and arbitrariness of application likely to result from the use
of this sanction as opposed to that of subsequent punishment.27 Due
to these remonstrations, acceptance of prior restrictions has been con-
fined mainly (although not exclusively) to two areas: the regulation
of the time, manner, and place of various forms of public expression;
22. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMAP. PaoD.
648, 651-52 (1955).
23. 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
24. Id. at 716.
25. In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911), the
Court had held that literature supporting a boycott could be enjoined along with the
boycott itself, since the literature becomes "verbal action" effectively damaging property.
See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALr L.J. 877,
932 (1963).
26. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
27. See Emerson, supra note 22, at 656-59. Discussing the injunction placed against
a publisher which had been challenged in Near v. Minnesota, this article comments:
On paper, it was a system for subsequent punishment by contempt procedure.
But in practice, the system was bound to operate as a serious prior re-
straint. Punishment could be summarily dispensed by a single official, without
jury trial or the other protections of criminal procedure, for infraction of a
loose and illusive mandate.
Id. at 654.
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and the regulation of obscenity in motion pictures. In order to with-
stand constitutional scrutiny regulation of these areas must be limited
and specific.
In the area of public exercise of first amendment rights, for
example, an ordinance requiring a permit for the distribution of
pamphlets was held invalid where the standards for issuance were not
limited to ways which might be regarded as inconsistent with the
maintenance of public order or as involving disorderly conduct, the
molestation of the inhabitants or the misuse or littering of the streets.28
A Minnesota statute which prohibited public assembly without a
permit was also invalidated as an unconstitutional means of suppres-
sion of the right of assembly. The permit was to be granted upon con-
sideration of the possibility of riot, disturbance, or disorderly con-
duct; facts showed that the standards were applied discriminatorily
and arbitrarily.29 In Cantwell v. Connecticut30 the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses asserted the unconstitutionality of a Connecticut statute which
granted solicitation licenses only to those organizations defined as
"religious" by the state public welfare council. The Supreme Court
concurred with the petitioners' claim, finding that the discretion given
the welfare council to determine "religiousness" exceeded the per-
missible limitations of restraint. This discretion transcended regula-
tion of solicitation and infringed upon petitioners' freedom of re-
ligion. Similarly, the Court condemned a statute requiring permits
for public assembly "in the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable,
and definite standards for the officials to follow [in the issuance of
the permits] .... 31
Significantly, however, where a statute properly confined the
exercise of discretion in the issuance of parade licenses to considera-
tions of safety and convenience, the Court upheld the power of a
locality to devise such a licensing system.32 Thus, it appears that statu-
tory regulation of the various forms of public exercise of first amend-
ment rights may be permitted if it consists of impartially-administered,
well-defined standards aimed at safeguarding public order.33
28. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
29. Hague v. 0IO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
30. 310 U.S. 296, 305-06 (1940).
31. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
32. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
33. See Emerson, supra note 22, at 667.
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The second field in which the Supreme Court has accepted a
system of prior restraint involves motion picture censorship. The
Court has authorized state-instituted systems of film censorship only
when incorporation of procedural safeguards will minimize the dan-
gers of erroneous judgment. Under the standards established by the
Court in Freedman v. Maryland34 the censor has the burden of prov-
ing that the film is unprotected expression and that his determination
is not final, but subject to judicial review which must be expeditious.
While the Court has struck down statutes regulating the con-
tent of expression in public assembly cases, it has allowed censorship
of movies, but even then only in the presence of elaborate procedural
safeguards. It should be noted that obscenity is not protected by the
first amendment,35 and that the Supreme Court tends to distinguish
films as a form of expression from literature.36
To insure the right of freedom of expression in literature, the
Court has placed a heavy burden on persons seeking to impose re-
straints. 37 In New York Times v. United States38 (the "Pentagon
Papers" case), Justice Brennan argued that
the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of
the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward conse-
quences may result . . . . Thus, only governmental allegation and
proof that publication must inevitably ... cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea
[an example given in Near v. Minnesota] can support even the issu-
ance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclu-
sions be sufficient .... 39
This passage cautions that implementation of prior restraint must be
limited to situations where there may be a definite forecast of a viola-
tion of protected interests which are superior to first amendment
rights. In what manner is this policy applied when the publication
34. 380 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1965).
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
36. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
37. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
38. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
39. Id. at 725-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The concurring
opinions of Justices White and Stewart suggest more strongly the availability of prior
restraint had the government made a stronger case showing a clear and present danger.
Justices Black and Douglas, in two separate concurring opinions, negated the avail-
ability of any such restraint.
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sought to be restrained is student-authored and distributed within a
school?
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education40 presented this issue to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In this case, the policy of the
board of education required prior approval by the school administra-
tion of all literature to be distributed on the school grounds. A board
rule established guidelines for the granting of such approval:
No material shall be distributed which, either by its content or by the
manner of distribution itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly
operation and discipline of the school, will cause violence or dis-
order, or will constitute an invasion of the rights of others.4 '
This policy was challenged by students who distributed their own
newsletter in school without seeking advance permission. The court
struck down the policy, finding it to be procedurally deficient ac-
cording to standards set out in Freedman v. Maryland.42 Notably, the
policy lacked both a time limit on review and a method to appeal
decisions.43 The Eisner opinion emphasized, however, that the board
policy was not unconstitutional as an authorization of prior restraint.44
The court found that the standard set forth by the board conformed
generally with the Tinker requirement that a foreseeable disruption
must be substantial and material in order to form the basis of a re-
strictive action. Thus, the court concluded that the board's policy
was not overbroad. 45 Nevertheless, the opinion did recommend the
formulation of more precise guidelines in order to avoid constitu-
tional issues which might arise in particular applications of the rule.4 6
40. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 805.
42. See text at supra note 34.
43. Id. at 810; see Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 n.5 (D. Mass.
1970):
If anything, safeguards are more essential to protect publishers of a student
newspaper than distributors of a motion picture .... [T]he effective finality
of a censor's decision regarding the content of a student newspaper is all the
more probable and consequently so is the danger that protected expression
will be suppressed.
44. 440 F.2d at 810; accord, Baughman v. Freienmuth, 343 F. Supp. 487 (D. Md.
1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
45. 440 F.2d at 809.
46. Id.
[G]reater specificity . . . would be highly desirable .... The Board [should]
resolve . . . some of the difficult constitutional issues .... For example, to
what extent . . . [may] school authorities . . . suppress criticism of their own
actions and policies? . . . [Will school officials] take reasonable measures to
minimize or forestall potential disorder ... that might otherwise be generated
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Writing for the court in Eisner, Judge Kaufman cited Near v. Minne-
sota47 and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire4 in support of the premise
that the state may suppress speech which has the effect of force. 49 In
the school environment, this definition would be satisfied by speech
substantially disruptive of the educational process. The crucial factor
to be noted is that if the existing rule had incorporated the necessary
procedural safeguards, the Eisner court would have permitted the
requirement of prior submission of the student publications.
Confronting the issue of prior restraint under circumstances simi-
lar to those in Eisner, the court in Fujishima reached a contrary con-
clusion. The Chicago Board of Education regulation challenged in
Fujishima provided no criteria for the approval or disapproval of
literature to be distributed within the school. This factor, however,
was not determinative of the court's decision to declare the regula-
tion unconstitutional. The court flatly observed that "[b]ecause sec-
tion 6-19 requires prior approval of publications, it is unconstitu-
tional as a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. '" 0
This conclusion derives from two premises. First, under the Tinker
doctrine, unless there is a showing of material and substantial inter-
ference with school discipline, the school may not restrain the first
amendment rights of its students.51 Secondly, according to Near v.
Minnesota, these rights include the freedom to distribute publications
without prior censorship.52 If all prior restraints are invalid under the
first amendment, and if students possess full first amendment rights,
then a prior restraint is not valid when applied to the student's exer-
cise of those rights. Thus, the position taken by the court on prior
restraint eliminates any need to balance the school's interest in avoid-
ing disruption against the students' rights. Any restraint of the rights
of the student must be in the form of subsequent punishment.
In reaching its decision, the court was compelled to consider
Eisner, which would have allowed prior restraint if accompanied by
proper procedural safeguards. Unimpressed by the Second Circuit's
in reaction to the distribution of controversial or unpopular opinions, before they
rdsort to banishing the ideas from school grounds? ...The Board might also
undertake to describe the kinds of disruption ...that it contemplates would
typically justify censorship ....
47. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
48. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
49. 440 F.2d at 807.




conclusion in Eisner, the Fujishima court announced its belief that
"Eisner is unsound constitutional law."53 Judge Sprecher suggested
that the Eisner court had erred in interpreting Tinker to allow prior
censorship of student publications as a "tool of school officials in
'forecasting' substantial disruption of school activities." 54 Rather, the
Fujishima opinion observed that the Tinker forecast principle permits
restraint of freedom of expression only when school officials can, pre-
dict the likelihood of disruption in school discipline from existing
or ongoing conduct. By this interpretation, Tinker cannot stand for the
proposition that student conduct must be submitted to administrative
examination prior to its exercise so that potentially disruptive activi-
ties may be prohibited.
The Tinker forecast rule is properly a formula for determining
when the requirements of school discipline justify punishment of stu-
dents for exercise of their First-Amendment rights. It is not a basis
for establishing a system of censorship and licensing designed to pre-
vent the exercise of First-Amendment rights.55
The Fujishima court has maintained that Eisner erred in 'in-
terpreting Tinker to allow prior restraint of publications. However,
the Second Circuit read Tinker to affirm school authority as well as
student freedom of expression, and to allow the prohibition, of :cer-
tain expression. For authority to allow prior review, the Eisner opin-
ion sought support from cases which provide exceptions to the gen-
eral rule against prior restraints.56 Eisner then invoked Tinker's
formulation of students' first amendment rights in order to judge
the criteria by which school authorities had censored student-pub-
lished literature.57
It is submitted that the disputed "Tinker forecast rule"- itself
should not be determinative of the authority of a school to use a
system of prior review of student-published literature. In evaluating
the extent of the school's right to impose prior restraint, two other
points made in Tinker become relevant. First, the Court observed
that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or- apprehension of dis-
turbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expres-
53. Id. at 1359.
54. Id. at 1358.
'55. Id.
56. See 440 F.2d at 806-07. ,The court found support in Near v. Minnesota, Freed-
man v..Maryland, and related cases.
57. See id. at 807-08.
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sion."58 This indicates the heavy burden of justification borne by
school officials whenever any restraint of expression is undertaken.
Secondly, in its discussion of constitutional protections, the opinion
declared that "[f]irst amendment rights, applied in the light of the
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to
teachers and students."5 9 This statement suggests that special con-
siderations are necessitated by the confined and sometimes volatile con-
ditions in certain schools, and perhaps by the young age of the stu-
dents as well. 60
In positive terms, therefore, students are assured of their right to
express opinions, political views, or criticism of school policy in their
publications. At the same time the school, charged with providing
for the effectiveness of the educational process, has an interest in main-
taining order. Acting in this interest, the school may regulate the
time, manner and place of distribution to assure that it will not inter-
fere with the operation of the school activities. Such regulation, which
would not go to the content of the literature, was recognized to be
valid in Fujishima.6 1
A system of prior review such as that contemplated in Eisner,
which would prevent distribution only of literature that would be
a material and substantial interference, theoretically might serve
simply as a precaution and not an abridgment upon the students'
freedom of expression. Reading the publication would undoubtedly
keep the administration abreast of student concerns, but this does
not justify prior review. Such a system presents a potential for abuse,
and, given the narrow scope of restrainable material, additionally ap-
pears to be a generally futile exercise of authority. Furthermore, the
anticipation of review affords the possibility of chilling a free and un-
inhibited expression of opinions. Since a school may rely on the deter-
rent effect of subsequent punishment to prevent distribution of dis-
ruptive literature, as well as regulate the time, place, and manner of
distribution, the school's interest, under ordinary circumstances, does
58. 393 U.S. at 508.
59. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
60. Cf. concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514;
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57-58
nn.6 & 7 (4th Cir. 1971).
61. 460 F.2d at 1359. "Such injunction [against the enforcement of the school's
policy of predistribution review] will not prevent defendants from promulgating reason-
able, specific regulations setting forth the time, manner and place in which distribution
of written materials may occur."
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not seem to overcome the "heavy presumption" against the validity
of a prior restraint. 2
Outside the educational environment, restraint of expression has
been allowed where the expression is found to present "a clear and
present danger."63 The problems which exist in particular schools
may create situations where the probability of disruption is demon-
strably higher than that in other schools. The existence of such cir-
cumstances may justify a flexible system of prior review which would
allow limited restraints upon distribution. A school with racial ten-
sions might exemplify a situation where an inflammatory publication
could directly increase hostility and endanger the school community.
Comparable situations64 necessitate the administration's ability to
eliminate the focus of disruption before the school is affected.
The power to initiate such action may be regulated, as, for
example, may the power of the police to conduct a search which is
valid under the fourth amendment. In order to obtain a search war-
rant from a magistrate, an officer is required to show probable cause.
The magistrate acts as an objective and neutral decision maker to
determine whether or not the officer has cause to conduct a search.
Similarly, in order to impose a system of prior review such as that
anticipated in Eisner, the school should be able to show justification-
for instance, the existence of turmoil within the school, or the fre-
quent appearance of disruptive literature. Neither the Eisner nor
Fujishima courts provide guidelines upon which to base a determina-
tion as to the existence of extraordinary circumstances. Eisner justi-
fies prior review by the school's general regulatory power. Fujishima
does not indicate recognition of any situation where the school's in-
terest might be sufficiently threatened to validate prior restraint. The
conflict between these opinions denies the existence of an accommo-
dation between first amendment rights and the demands of maintain-
ing an educational system. Even under Fujishima school authorities
62. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
63. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
64. See ACLU, Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools 11-12 (September,
1968), cited in S. Nahmod, Black Armbands and Underground Newspapers: Freedom of
Speech in the Public Schools, 51 Cm. B. Rnc. 144, 153 (1969).
Neither the faculty advisors nor the principal should prohibit the publication
or distribution of material except when such publication or distribution would
clearly endanger the health or safety of the students, or clearly and imminently
threaten to disrupt the educational process, or might be of a libelous nature.
Such judgment, however, should never be exercised because of disapproval
or disagreement with the article in question.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
conceivably might institute some type of review under a "clear and
present danger" theory. Certainly, any school may take steps to deal
with an emergency situation.65 It would seem that even the student
in Fujishima who distributed literature during a fire drill might have
been punished on the grounds of improper conduct during the drill,
unless it could be shown that other students distributing nonpolitical
literature were not so reprimanded.
In order to preserve first amendment rights in such situations, and
to clarify the parameters of school authority, definite standards are
needed to avoid the implementation of ad hoc regulations which
might develop. The court in Fujishima might have directed educa-
tional authorities to define the conditions which would give a school
sufficient cause to implement a regulated system of prior review. The
ideal standard would have both administrators and students aware
of the extent of school authority and student responsibility.
Since controversial literature to which school officials may object
is often more symptomatic than causative of discontent, stifling the
outlets for such dissatisfaction can result in problems more serious
than any controversy initiated by the expression of opinions. The
school's policy should be to foster bilateral debate and responsible
criticism. Only where the atmosphere warrants particular caution is
a system of prior review a justifiable means of maintaining order.
MICHELE 0. HEFFERNAN'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NONTENURED STATE UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
UPON NONRENEWAL OF CONTRACT.
ItJanuary 1969, David E. Roth, a nontenured assistant profes-
sor at a state university was notified that he would not be rehired after
his one-year contract expired. No reasons were given, and no hearing
was offered concerning his nonrenewal. He brought suit in a United
States district court, alleging that the university's action deprived 'him
of both substantive and procedural rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 The plaintiff claimed that the decision was in retaliation 'for
65. See Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1170 (S.D., Tex.
1971),
1. Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
